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1. Introduction 
The focus in the literature on trade union influence has mainly been on the role of bargaining 
structure, bargaining issues, and union preferences within profit–seeking firms. While much 
is known of how union preferences influence bargaining outcomes,1 little attention is given to 
employers’ objectives. There are probably larger differences in employer objectives, for 
example between for–profit and non–profit firms, than in unions preferences, which at least 
clearly include the wage level. During the latest decades, a growing fraction of the workforce 
has been employed in the public and non–profit sectors.2 Trade unions are present to a greater 
degree at least in the public sector than in the profit–seeking industries.3 There are also 
numerous reasons why for–profit enterprises may not solely be described by profit 
maximizing behaviour. The present paper compares wage bargaining outcomes across 
different types of employers. 
  
Some theoretical papers have compared the outcome of collective bargaining in the private 
and public sectors.4  Gravelle (1984) considers bargaining covering both the wage and 
employment levels in a profit maximization firm versus a welfare maximization firm. Haskel 
and Szymanski (1993) consider a wage bargaining model under similar assumptions on 
employer objectives. They find that without any weight on union utility in the objective of the 
public firm, the only sources of different wage levels are differences in bargaining power or 
differences in product market power. Holmlund (1997) assumes that the public sector consists 
of agencies maximizing output subjected to a budget–constraint. With bargaining at the 
agency level, the wage is higher in the public sector than in the private sector with equal 
union bargaining powers unless the market powers of the private firms are substantial. The 
model in the present paper assumes that product demand is independent of employer type in 
order to focus on the effect of employer objectives. In contrast to the above studies, the 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Booth (1984), Carruth and Oswald (1987), Pemberton (1988), Pencavel (1991), and Oswald (1993). 
2 Between 1960 and 1990, government employment as a share of total employment rose from 12.8 to 27.7 in 
Norway, from 11.1 to 17.6 in the UK, and from 14.7 to 15.0 in the US, see Blank (1993) for the UK and the US. 
In the US, the value added in non–profit enterprises as a share of total value added rose from 2.9 to 4.3 percent 
between 1980 and 1997, see Ruhm and Borkoski (2000). 
3 Around 1990, the union density rate was higher in the public sector than in the private sector in 13 out of the 
14 OECD countries with available data, see Blanchflower (1996). In the US, the density rate was 36.7 percent in 
the public sector and 12.9 percent in the private sector. The corresponding numbers for the UK were 55.4 and 
37.8. 
4 A growing literature investigates union effects in the public sector. Recent theoretical contributions are 
Babcock et al. (1997), Strøm (1999) and Falch (2001). Gregory and Borland (1999) summarize the empirical 
literature on public sector labour markets. 
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present model includes fixed costs, and alternative functional forms of product demand are 
considered. 
 
Welfare maximization is an ideal position of governments and non–profit organizations. In 
practice, when managers run subsidized public firms or agencies, output maximization is a 
description of an idealistic type of management. Freeman (1975) presents a comparison of 
non–profit and profit–seeking enterprises in this case. When the price is given, an output 
maximizing employer equates average costs and the price, in contrast to a profit maximizing 
employer who sets the marginal cost equal to the price.  
 
Managers in all sectors are likely to have preferences that diverge from the preferences of the 
owners of the enterprises. The degree of influence of the managers’ objectives is likely to 
depend on enterprise size and ownership structure. I discuss two extreme cases of enterprise 
behaviour when the objective of the management and the owners differ. Both cases assume 
that the management preferences unilaterally describe the employer. In the first case, the 
Leviathan maximizes revenue, and in the second case, the Leviathan has preferences over 
manager wage and management size. 
 
Section 2 presents the different employer objectives discussed. The bargaining model is set 
out in Section 3, while the comparative results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Employer objectives 
The following cases of employer objectives V are discussed: 
Case 1. Profit maximization; V = Π = profit. 
Case 2. Welfare maximization; V = Π + CS = profit + consumer surplus 
Case 3. Output maximization; V = X = output. 
Case 4. Revenue maximization; V = R = revenue. 
Case 5. Management maximization; V = v(M, ω) = the managers’ utility (M is the number of 
managers and ω is their wage). 
  
In all cases, the utility functions must be interpreted as the loss of closing the firm or agency. 
Case 1 is the traditional profit–seeking firm. Cases 2 and 3 are the prevailing objectives of 
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public firms or other non–profit organizations in the existing literature on collective 
bargaining. While welfare maximization is the traditional description of a ‘benevolent 
dictator’, application of welfare maximization by managers in public agencies gives few and 
weak control mechanisms for the government. Holmlund (1997) and Falch (2001) assume 
that bargaining occurs within government departments or bureaus that maximize the volume 
of public services. Output maximization is a description of second–best preferences in 
decentralized non–profit organization. The managers seek to enhance productivity.  
 
Cases 1–3 neglect economic behaviour within the management in complex organizations. 
Cases 4 and 5 are two specifications of the objectives when the management behaves in a 
selfish way. Both cases are relevant for large business firms, non–profit enterprises, as well as 
the public sector. An implicit assumption in Case 4 is that the things from which managers 
derive satisfaction all vary directly with the size of the enterprise. This was suggested by 
Baumol (1959) for private firms and Niskanen (1971) for public agencies. Case 5 specifies 
the types of expenditures the managers prefer. The managers’ utility is assumed to be 
positively related to their wage level and the management size. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the differences between the cases. Under profit maximization, optimality 
occurs when the marginal cost and the marginal income are equalized, as illustrated by point 
C1. In optimum under welfare maximum, point C2, the marginal cost is equal to the marginal 
propensity to pay. In the figure, there is a positive profit because the marginal cost is 
increasing and fixed costs are low. Under output maximization, the output increases until total 
costs become equal to the income, as illustrated by point C3. This is also the optimum under 
revenue maximization if the marginal revenue is positive at this point. If not, it is optimal 
with a lower production as illustrated by point C4. The last case, management maximization, 
can be seen as the management seeks to extract rents from the market in order to pay excess 
management wage costs. Thus, management utility is potentially at its maximum when profit 
is maximized. The outcome will be C5 = C1. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
With wage bargaining, the marginal cost is not given only by technology, but is partly 
determined by the bargaining outcome. The impact of the different employer objectives on the 
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bargaining outcome will reduce (increase) the output differences between the cases if the 
‘high production’ employers have a worse (better) bargaining position than the ‘low 
production’ employers. Since employment differences mainly follow from Figure 1, the rest 
of this paper concentrate on wage differentials. 
 
 
3. The bargaining model 
Assume a rent maximizing trade union covering all workers. The union loss during a dispute 
is ( )U N w w= − , where w is the wage of the union members N and w  is their reservation 
wage. The determination of w  will not be discussed in this paper. The present analysis 
considers whether different employer objectives give rise to wage differentials within a given 
structure of the economy, and does not analyse any general equilibrium effects of changes in 
the objectives for a large segment of firms. 
 
Because there seems to be some disagreement on whether unions have bargaining power over 
other issues than wages, see, e.g., Pencavel (1991) and Oswald (1993), only wage bargaining 
is considered in the present paper. In addition, I follow the main part of the literature by only 
considering a static ‘one–shot’ bargaining game, and by assuming that the employer 
unilaterally set the employment after the wage bargain.5  
 
The Nash bargaining solution illustrates the bargaining outcome. The Nash maximand is 
V UγΩ = ,               (1) 
where γ is the relative bargaining power of the employer. Maximizing (1) with respect to the 
union wage yields the wage mark–up over the reservation wage as 
Nw Vw
w w 1
w
− = − ε + γ ε .             (2) 
There are two potential sources of wage differentials between employer types. The values of 
the wage elasticity of demand for labour N wNw w N∂∂ε =  and the wage elasticity of the employer 
objective V wVw w V∂∂ε =  may depend on the preferences of the employer. With an elastic demand 
for labour the union wage demand is low since a marginal increase in the wage has a large 
negative impact on employment. The employer’s resistance against paying a higher wage is 
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only related to how much the objective is reduced. Evaluating the elasticities, one must take 
into account two constraints facing the employers. The profit must be nonnegative, Π = R–
wN–ωM ≥ 0, and the wages must not fall short of the reservation wages, w w≥  and ω ≥ ω . 
 
In order to highlight the effect of different employer objectives, capital is extracted from the 
model as in, e.g., Booth (1984), Carruth and Oswald (1987) and Oswald (1993). In addition, 
the demand and production functions are assumed to be equal in all cases. The following 
production function is used throughout the paper. 
0 if M 1
X
aN if M 1, 1.α
<=  ≥ α ≤
            (3) 
Management is introduced into the model in order to discuss a more realistic Leviathan type 
of organizations, Case 5, than simply revenue maximization. For the other cases, there is 
fixed costs. It is assumed that production requires a coordinating management. The minimum 
number of managers is normalized to unity, and a rise in management size above unity is 
assumed to have no effect on production. With this production function, it is optimal in Cases 
1–4 to set M = 1 and the manager’s wage equal to his reservation wage ω . Thus, ω  is fixed 
administrative costs, or fixed operational–dependent costs, in these cases.6  
 
The specification of the production function merits some discussion of the employer objective 
in Case 5. If one think about a firm where the owner initially hires one manager, which is the 
minimum required, Case 5 implies that this manager prefers to have others by his side, but 
that the utility function will not change as more managers are hired. One can interpret the 
utility function as the utility function of the CEO, as in Migué and Bélanger (1974). But 
notice that, as will be become evident, union wage and employment is independent of the 
functional form of the manager(s) utility function, which only determines how management 
rent is divided between manager wage and management size. 
 
In order for the union to be able to increase the wage, there must be rents to share. As usual in 
the literature on trade unions, the market in which the enterprise operates is assumed to be of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Repeated wage bargaining games where introduced by Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and Strand (1989). For 
example Grout (1984) and Falch (2001) assume that employment is determined prior to the wage bargain. 
6 Allowing the optimal management size to depend on output size will complicate the model considerably 
without introducing new mechanisms. 
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the monopolistic competition type.7 Often different types of employers operate in different 
product markets. How the product demand influences union wages is, however, well known 
in the literature. For example, increased elasticity of product demand will make a wage rise 
more costly for the union because the loss of employment increases. To emphasize the pure 
effect of employer objectives, I will assume that the product demand is equal in all cases 
discussed.8 
 
The inverse demand function is P = P(X) and the revenue is R = P(X)X. The elasticity of the 
revenue with respect to production, denoted ( )R XX R X 1∂∂κ = = κ ≤ , is interpreted as an 
indicator of product market competitiveness. When the price is given for the enterprise, κ = 1, 
while the marginal revenue is equal to zero for κ = 0.9 The elasticity of product market 
competitiveness with respect to employment is denoted NN N∂κκ ∂ κε = .  
 
Table 1 presents the expressions for εNw and εVw in the different cases, where subscript 
denotes the cases. J is an indicator variable for whether the profit–constraint is binding, 
0 if 0
J
1 if 0.
Π >=  Π =               (4) 
The profit is assumed to be positive in Case 1 (Π1 > 0), while the profit–constraint is binding 
in Cases 3 and 5 (Π3 = Π5 = 0). For a given wage, there may be a positive profit in optimum 
in Case 4. But since the employer only care about the revenue, increased wage does not 
decrease the employer utility level if Π4 > 0. Thus, in bargaining optimum, Π4 = 0. 
 
                                                          
7 If the firm has no market power (κ = 1, see below), there is constant return to scale (α = 1), and there is no 
fixed costs, the profit will be equal to zero and it is impossible for the union to increase the wage above the 
reservation wage. 
8 For public sector agencies, the government often determines the demand. A downward sloping demand 
function may thus require a justification. Consider a simple median voter model, the standard framework in 
public finance. The median voter is decisive and solely determines the behaviour of the government. The median 
voter is faced with the budget–constraint Ym(1–t) = Cm (Ym is the income level, t is the tax rate, and Cm is the 
private consumption). The budget–constraint of the government is tY = PX (Y is total private income and P is 
the price of the publicly provided good X). Combining the budget–constraints yields m mY PX C= τ + , where τ = 
Ym/Y is the tax share of the median voter. τ and P are assumed to be exogenous in this type of models. 
Maximizing a quasi–concave median voter utility function, v = v(X, Cm), subjected to m mY PX C= τ + , yields 
the demand function X = X(P, Ym, τ), where ∂X/∂P < 0. In this case, the budget of the public sector agency R 
must be seen as determined by a rule corresponding to such a demand function, which implies that the size of 
the budget depends on the wage level.  
9 Some has argued that the demand for numerous governmental services is likely to be inelastic, i.e., κ is low. 
The empirical evidence, however, indicates that the wage elasticity of demand for labour is not substantially 
different in the public and private sectors, see Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) and Freeman (1986). 
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Table 1 here 
 
The wage elasticities of labour demand and the employer objective may differ across 
employer types for five reasons. They are described in the next section.  
 
 
4. Comparative results 
Because discrete different outcomes will be compared, the functional form of product demand 
must be specified. I will consider both a demand with constant elasticity and a linear demand. 
 
4.1. Constant elasticity product demand 
Assume that the inverse demand function is given by P = bX-ψ, 0 < ψ < 1. The revenue is R = 
bXκ, where κ = 1–ψ. Now κ is equal in all cases, and εκN = 0. In Case 2, the consumer surplus 
1
2 2CS R−κκ= , which yields the wage elasticity of the employer objective as 
( ) ( )
2 2
Vw 2
w N1 1ω
ακε = ακ + − .             (5) 
( )Vw 2ε  is independent of whether the profit–constraint is binding (Π2 = 0) or not (Π2 > 0). 
 
The comparative results are summarized in two propositions. In the first proposition, fixed 
costs are neglected, and Case 5 is not taken into account. 
 
Proposition 1. 
For constant elasticity product demand and ω = 0, w3 ≤ w1 = w2 = w4. Strict inequality holds 
for γ > 0.  
 
Proof: The results follow from inspection of εNw and εVw in Table 1. 
 
With a monopoly union, γ = 0, the wage is solely determined by the labour demand elasticity. 
Without fixed administrative costs, 0ω = , the elasticity is equally determined by the 
parameters α and κ in all cases, and it follows that the union wage is independent of the 
employer objective. When the employer has bargaining power (γ > 0), the size of the wage 
elasticity of the employer objective matter. This is basically the same model as in Haskel and 
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Szymanski (1993) and Holmlund (1997). As in Haskel and Szymanski (1993), the present 
model implies equal wages under profit and welfare maximization. Holmlund (1997) shows 
that an output maximizing employer may have stronger incentives to withstand union wage 
pressure than a profit maximizing employer because in the former case, the objective is more 
sensitive to wage changes. In the present model where the product market competitiveness is 
equal for all employer types in contrast to Holmlund’s model, output maximization stands out 
as a special case. The wage elasticity of the employer objective is equal in all cases except in 
Case 3, where the elasticity is larger, ( ) ( )Vw Vwi 3ε < ε , i = (1, 2, 4).10 A wage increase is 
more ‘costly’ under output maximization than in the other cases. When the wage increases, 
some of the increased cost is put into a higher price. This increases revenue, which partly 
reduces the negative effect on the employer utility level of a higher wage in all cases except 
in Case 3. Under output maximization, monetary measures are not directly included in the 
objective. This will be denoted the non–monetary objective effect.11  
 
Proposition 2 extends the comparison to take into account the fixed costs ( 0ω > ), which 
makes it possible to include Case 5 into the analysis. 
 
Proposition 2. 
For constant elasticity product demand and ω > 0; 
(i) When γ = 0, w3 = w4 < w1 = w5. If Π2 > 0, w2 = w1 = w5. If Π2 = 0, w2 = w3 = w4. 
(ii) When γ > 0, w1 < w5 and w3 < w4 < w5. If Π2 > 0, w1 < w2 < w5. If Π2 = 0, w2 = w4. 
 
Proof: The results follow from inspection of εNw and εVw in Table 1. 
 
Without employer bargaining power (γ = 0), introducing fixed costs obviously does not 
influence the employment level under profit maximization because the employment–decision 
                                                          
10 Holmlund (1997) only considers public sector agencies with a fixed budget, implying κ = 0. Thus, the wage 
elasticity of demand for labour is more elastic in the private sector than the public sector, working in the 
direction of lower wage in the private sector. Setting κ = 0 in Case 3 in the present model, it follows that w3 < w1 
if 11 1+ακ < . Then the non–monetary objective effect dominates the effect of the different labour demand 
elasticities. 
11 In a monopoly union model with inelastic labour demand, Strøm (1999) presents two additional arguments for 
lower wage in the local public sector than the private sector. First, with inelastic demand, higher wage has to be 
financed by higher taxes, which partially lowers the disposable wage for all union members. Second, higher 
wage means less local public services available for the union members. Both effects are likely to be absent for 
firm specific unions in the private sector.    
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of the firm only depends on marginal values. Case 5 may be described as two–step 
maximization. First, profit is maximized, and second, the profit is divided between M and ω. 
Only the first step is relevant for the determination of N. Thus, from the union point of view, 
there are no differences between Cases 1 and 5. In Cases 3 and 4, however, the employment 
must be reduced when ω  increases. The profit–constraint implies that after a wage rise, and 
thereby reduced employment, each worker must cover a larger share of the fixed costs. The 
vertical distance between the average cost curve and a curve describing average variable costs 
increases. Thus, the wage elasticity of labour demand is more elastic in Cases 3 and 4 than in 
Cases 1 and 5, which also is demonstrated by Freeman (1975). This will be denoted the fixed 
costs’ labour demand effect, which consequently works in the direction of low wage in Cases 
3 and 4. If the profit–constraint is not binding in case 2 (Π2 > 0), the employment level is 
independent of the size of ω  as in Cases 1 and 5. If the magnitude of the fixed costs implies 
that the profit–constraint gets binding in Case 2 (Π2 = 0), however, the constraint determines 
the labour demand in Case 2 in the same way as in Cases 3 and 4. 
 
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 reveals a third channel trough which wage differentials may arise. 
The fixed costs’ employer objective effect follows from the fact that fixed costs influence the 
wage elasticity of the employer objective differently across cases. While administrative costs 
are only a cost component in Cases 1–4, they influence the management utility level directly 
in Case 5. Thus, in Case 5, ωM is a component that contributes to increased employer utility, 
and thereby ( ) ( )Vw Vw5 iε < ε , i = (1, 2, 3, 4). Combined with the fact that ( ) ( )Nw Nw5 iε ≤ ε , 
the fixed costs’ employer objective effect yields that the wage is highest in Case 5. 
 
Comparing Cases 1–4, the fixed costs as a share of union wage costs, wNω , differs across cases 
simply because the employment levels differ. The fixed costs’ employer objective effect is the 
only difference between Cases 1 and 2 when Π2 > 0. Because 
2 2 1 1w N w N
ω ω< , ( ) ( )Vw Vw2 1ε < ε , 
and consequently, w1 < w2. Since the only difference between Cases 3 and 4 is the non–
monetary objective effect, w3 < w4. All this proves that the wage is lowest either in Case 1 or 
3. The fixed costs’ labour demand effect and the non–monetary objective effect work in the 
direction of lowest wage in Case 3, while the fixed costs’ employer objective effect works in 
the direction of lowest wage in Case 1. ( ) ( )Vw Vw3 1ε < ε  requires both a high value of ω  and 
a high value of κ. In order to have w1 < w3, it is also necessary that γ is high since 
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( ) ( )Nw Nw1 3ε < ε .  Thus, although it is in general ambiguous whether the wage is lowest in 
Case 1 or 3, the wage is likely to be lowest in Case 3. A small numerical version of the model 
is presented in Table 2 to through more light on the role of the parameters ω , γ and κ. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The benchmark example in Table 2 is the monopoly union model without fixed costs. In 
Example 2, the relative bargaining power of the employer is 0.67, and it follows directly from 
Proposition 1 that the wage is lowest in Case 3. Introducing fixed costs when γ = 0 reduces 
the wage in the cases with a binding profit–constraint. In the other cases, the labour demand 
elasticity is unchanged. Example 4 combines Examples 2 and 3, and the wage is still lowest in 
Case 3. Example 5 increases the product market competitiveness κ and normalizes the 
employment in Case 3 to be at the same level as in Example 4. In this example, both κ, γ and 
ω  is high, and the wage is equal in Cases 1 and 3. Table 2 also confirms that the wage is 
never higher in Cases 1–4 than in Case 5. Regarding Cases 2 and 4, the wage tends to be 
lowest in Case 4, but the differences are small.  
 
4.2. Linear product demand 
Is Propositions 1 and 2 due to the assumed functional form of product demand? Assuming 
constant elasticity of product demand is extreme in the way that the marginal revenue is 
always positive. For a more ‘linear’ product demand, the marginal revenue may be negative, 
and the product market competitiveness κ is decreasing in output size. The comparative 
results under a linear product demand function are presented in the next propositions. 
 
Proposition 3. 
For linear product demand and ω = 0; 
(i) When γ = 0, w2 ≤ w1 and w2 ≤ w3 = w4. Strict inequalities hold for α < 1. 
(ii) When γ > 0, w2 ≤ w1 and w2 < w3 < w4. Strict inequality holds for α < 1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
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Cases 3 and 4 are equal from the union’s point of view, and w3 = w4 when γ = 0. Comparing 
Cases 2–4, it is evident that N2 ≤ N3 = N4, where strict inequality holds for α < 1. Because 
X 0∂κ∂ < , κ2 ≥ κ3 = κ4, and the κ’s labour demand effect yields that w2 ≤ w3 = w4. Comparing 
Cases 2–4 with Case 1 is complicated by the fact that εκN < 0, working in the direction of 
lowest wage in Cases 2–4. The κ’s labour demand effect is not solely determined by the value 
of κ, but also by εκN. Appendix A proves that the effect via εκN dominates when Cases 1 and 2 
are compared, yielding that w2 ≤ w1. Comparing Cases 1 and 3, the result depends on the 
value of α. For 1 < α < 0.5, w1 < w3, while for α < 0.5, w3 < w1.  
 
The last effect influencing the wage differentials is the effect of κ on the value of εVw. This 
κ’s employer objective effect works in the same direction as the κ’s labour demand effect. 
Appendix A shows that the κ’s employer objective effect dominates the non–monetary 
objective effect, yielding that w2 < w3 when ω  = 0.  
 
In Proposition 4, all five mechanisms of wage differentials influence the results. 
 
Proposition 4. 
For linear product demand and ω > 0; 
(i) When γ = 0, w2 < w1 = w5 and w3 = w4. If Π2 = 0, w2 = w3 = w4.  
(ii) When γ > 0, w1 < w5, w2 < w5 and w3 < w4. If Π2 = 0, w2 < w3. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Comparing Case 2 and Cases 3–4 when γ = 0, the fixed costs’ labour demand effect works in 
the opposite direction of the κ’s labour demand effect if the profit–constraint is not binding in 
Case 2 (Π2 > 0), making the sign of the wage differential ambiguous. In the most general case 
with both employer bargaining power (γ > 0) and fixed costs (ω  > 0), the wage can be lowest 
either in Case 1, 2 or 3. It is no longer possible to generally determine the sign of the wage 
differential between Cases 1 and 2 because the fixed costs’ employer objective effect works in 
the direction of lowest wage in Case 1. Comparing Cases 2 and 3, the fixed costs’ labour 
demand effect may give lowest wage in Case 3 if the profit–constraint is not binding in Case 
2. But since both the 1 κ’s labour demand effect and the κ’s employer objective effect work in 
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the direction of a lower wage in Case 2 than in Cases 1 and 3, it is likely that the wage is 
lowest under welfare maximization.  
 
The wage is highest in one of the Leviathan cases. While the fixed costs’ labour demand 
effect and the fixed costs’ employer objective effect work in the direction of highest wage in 
Case 5, the κ’s labour demand effect and κ’s employer objective effect work in the direction 
of highest wage in Case 4. To investigate the importance of the two latter effects, Table 3 
presents simulations similar to the simulations in Table 2. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
In the first example, the parameter values are chosen such that the values of κ3 and N3 are 
equal to the values in Example 1 Table 2. The results confirm that the κ’s labour demand 
effect yields lowest wage in Case 2, and highest wage in Cases 3 and 4 since α > 0.5. 
Introducing bargaining power of the employer (Example 2) has a small effect in Case 4 
because κ is low at the present high employment level. A revenue maximization employer 
seems to be in a weak position in wage bargaining when ∂κ/∂X < 0. When κ gets low, the 
employer has little to lose from a wage increase. The non–monetary objective effect markedly 
reduces the wage in Case 3 compared to Case 4. However, the wage in Case 3 is still higher 
than in Cases 1 and 5. The non–monetary objective effect is not strong enough to alter the sign 
of the wage differential between these cases.  
 
With administrative costs and a monopoly union (Example 3), the wage in Cases 3 and 4 is 
lower than the wage in Cases 1 and 5, reflecting that the fixed costs’ labour demand effect is 
stronger than the κ’s labour demand effect when these cases are compared. However, with 
some employer bargaining power, the κ’s employer objective effect results in relatively bad 
performance in Cases 3 and 4 from the employers point of view.  
 
In the simulations, the wage is always lowest in Case 2.12 It is striking that while the wage is 
lowest in Case 3 in the simulations with constant elasticity of product demand, the three cases 
with lower employment have lower wages in the simulations with a linear demand. The 
counterpart to this result is that in the latter simulations, the wage is always lowest in Case 2, 
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while in the former simulations, Case 2 is among the cases with highest wage. The functional 
form of the product demand seems to be extremely important for how well a specific type of 
employer performs in wage bargaining. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Employers differ for a variety of reasons. This paper has revealed five channels through 
which wage bargaining outcomes may depend on employer objectives. Four of these channels 
influence the wage bargaining outcome within all types of employers by altering the wage 
elasticities of labour demand and the employer objective. The different channels are 
summarized in Table 4, which presents the effects on the relative wage between the profit 
maximizing case and the other cases discussed. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
The non–monetary objective effect is specific to the output maximization case. When the 
employer does not care about monetary issues, changes in monetary values have no direct 
effect on the utility level. Thus, increased price following a wage rise has no independent 
effect on the employer objective, making such an employer more hesitant against wage 
increases than employers with monetary objectives. To the extent that public sector objectives 
are related to non–monetary issues, this effect may contribute to a lower wage in the public 
sector than the private sector, consistent with the evidence of lower union wage mark–up in 
the public sector than in the private sector in the US [e.g., Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1986, and 
Blanchflower, 1996]. Unfortunately, little work has been done on this issue outside the US, 
but Blanchflower (1996) find only a minor difference in the union wage mark–up between the 
sectors in the UK. 
 
The fixed costs’ labour demand effect works in the direction of low wage when the employer 
is faced with a profit–constraint because then fewer workers must cover the fixed costs after a 
wage rise. The fixed costs’ employer objective effect works in the direction of low wage in 
cases with relatively low employment because then fixed costs per worker is high. The κ’s 
labour demand effect and the κ’s employer objective effect say how differences in the level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Notice that the profit–constraint in Case 2 is never binding in the simulations in Table 3. 
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product market competitiveness κ influences the wage elasticities. When κ is negatively 
related to output size (the product demand function is more ‘linear’ than under constant 
elasticity), both channels work in the direction of lower wage under welfare maximization 
than in the other cases. 
 
The formal analysis and the simulations reveal some notable findings. Increased ‘linearity’ of 
product demand tends to favour employers with low production. The Leviathan type of 
employer with low production considered (management maximization) performs quite well in 
the wage bargaining under a linear product demand and performs badly under a product 
demand with constant elasticity. For the other case of a Leviathan considered (revenue 
maximization), the production is high, and the performance of the employer is related to the 
product demand function in the opposite way as the former case. Another important finding is 
that both employers maximizing welfare and output may perform better in the wage 
bargaining than a profit maximizing employer. The condition for output maximization to 
perform better than profit maximization is that the product demand is not ‘too linear’. As the 
‘linearity’ increases, the disadvantage of high production in the output maximization case gets 
larger than the advantage of having a non–monetary objective. On the other hand, the 
condition for a welfare maximizing employer to perform better in the wage bargaining than a 
profit maximizing employer is a product demand that is ‘linear enough’. As the linearity 
increases, the advantage of a more elastic product demand than marginal revenue gets larger 
than the disadvantage of high production. 
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Appendix A. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Consider the inverse linear product demand function P = m–nX. Then the first order 
conditions in the different cases can be written 
( )i i i iw N m 2nX X , i 1,5= α − = ,       (A.1) 
( ) ( )i i i iw N J 1 m nX X J , i 2,3, 4= α + − α − − ω =   ,       (A.2) 
where J = 1 in Cases 3 and 4 and if Π2 = 0. Further, it follows that 
m 2nX
m nX
−κ = − ,            (A.3) 
( ) ( )N
X nmX
X m 2nX m nXκ
∂κ αε = α = −∂ κ − − .        (A.4) 
 
Utilizing (A.1)–(A.4), the wage elasticities of the demand for labour can be written 
( ) ( ) ( )iNw i i i
m 2nX , i 1,5
m 4nX m 2nX
−ε = =α − − − ,      (A.5) 
( ) ( ) ( )i
i
i X
Nw i
i i X
m nX J
, i 2,3, 4
m 2nX m nX J
ω
ω
− −ε = =α − − − + ,      (A.6)
Utilizing (A.1)–(A.4) and that the consumer surplus 212CS nX= , the wage elasticities of the 
employer objective can be written 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1
Vw 1
1 1 X
m 2nX
m 2nX m nX ω
α −ε = α − − − + ,        (A.7) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2
2
2 X
Vw 2 1 1
2 22 2 X
1 J m nX J
m 1 J nX m J nX
ω
ω
+ α − −ε =  α − + − − + +    
      (A.8) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )3
3
3 X
Vw 3
3 3 X
m nX
m 2nX m nX
ω
ω
α − −ε = α − − − + ,                  (A.9) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
4
4 4
4
m 2nX
4m nX X
Vw 4
4 4 X
m nX
m 2nX m nX
− ω
−
ω
α − −ε = α − − − + ,                (A.10)  
( ) ( )( ) ( )5Vw 5 5 5
m 2nX
m 2nX m nX
α −ε = α − − − .                 (A.11) 
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Proof of part (i) 
It follows from (2) that w2 ≤ w1 if ( ) ( )Nw Nw1 2ε ≤ ε  (recall that γ = 0). Inspection of (A.5) 
and (A.6) reveals that this is true if (recall that ω  = 0 and that J = 0 when ω  = 0) 
 1 2
1 2
m 4nX m 2nX
m 2nX m nX
− −≤− − .                  (A.12) 
(A.12) is fulfilled if X2 ≤ 2X1, or equivalently, 12 1N 2 Nα≤ . Thus, evaluating the first order 
conditions (A.1) and (A.2) for 
1
2 1N 2 Nα= , it must be the case that w2 ≤ w1. Inserting 
1
2 1N 2 Nα=  into (A.2), it follows that w2 ≤ w1 if 
1
2 1
α−
α ≤ . This is always fulfilled for α ≤ 1, 
with strict inequality for α < 1. This proves that w2 ≤ w1. 
 
Recall that the expressions of εNw are equal in Cases 2 and 3 when ω  = 0. It follows thus that 
w3 ≤ w1 if 13 1N 2 Nα≤ . By a similar reasoning as above, it follows that w3 ≤ w1 if 
1
2
α−
α ≤ α . 
This is fulfilled if α ≤ 0.5. For α > 0.5, the condition is not fulfilled. Thus, w1 = w3 if α = 1 or 
α = 0.5, w1 < w3 if 0.5 < α < 1, and w3 < w1 if α < 0.5.  
 
Comparing Cases 2 and 3, it is evident that N2 ≤ N3, where strict inequality holds for α < 1. 
Thus, κ2 ≥ κ3 because X 0∂κ∂ < . This proves that ( ) ( )Nw Nw3 2ε ≤ ε  and w2 ≤ w3. Lastly, w3 = 
w4 because the first order conditions, determining the wage elasticities of the demand for 
labour, are equal in these cases. 
 
Proof of part (ii)  
The effects on the wages via the preferences of the employers work in the direction of lower 
wage in Case 2 than in Case 1 if ( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε < ε . Inspection of (A.7) and (A.8) reveals that 
( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε ≤ ε  if (recall that ω  = 0) 
1 2
1
1 22
m 2nX m nX
m nX m nX
− −≤− − .                  (A.13) 
(A.13) is fulfilled if 2 1X 2X≤ . This is the same condition as for ( ) ( )Nw Nw1 2ε ≤ ε . Thus, 
 20
both ( ) ( )Nw Nw1 2ε ≤ ε  (the κ’s labour demand effect) and ( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε ≤ ε  (the κ’s 
employer objective effect), proving that w2 ≤ w1. Strict inequalities hold for α < 1. 
 
N1 < N4 yields that κ4 < κ1. Thus, from (A.7) and (A.8), it follows that ( ) ( )Vw Vw4 1ε < ε . The 
κ’s employer objective effect work in the direction of lower wage in Case 1 than in Case 4. 
Combined with ( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε ≤ ε  and ( ) ( )Nw Nw4 2ε ≤ ε , this proves that w2 < w4. Because 
m 2nX
m nX 1−− < , it follows from (A.9) and (A.10) that ( ) ( )Vw Vw4 3ε ≤ ε . This proves that w3 < w4. 
 
Comparing Cases 2 and 3, it follows from (A.8) and (A.9) that ( ) ( )Vw Vw3 2ε < ε  if 
( )2 3 3
mX 2kX , where k
m 2 1 nX
α< = + α − ,                (A.14) 
or equivalently, ( ) 12 3N 2k Nα< . Recalling that ( ) ( )Nw Nw3 2ε ≤ ε , it must follow from (A.2) 
that w2 < w3 for ( ) 12 3N 2k Nα=  if (A.14) holds. Inserting ( ) 12 3N 2k Nα=  into the first order 
condition in Case 2, it follows that w2 < w3 if 
1
2 1
3
m 2 1X K, where K
n 2 1
α−
α− α −> = α −                 (A.15) 
For α = 1, K = 0. For α < 1 and α ≠ 0.5, K < 0. Thus, K ≤ 0 for each α ≠ 0.5, and (A.15) is 
fulfilled for each α ≠ 0.5. For α = 0.5, it follows directly from (A.14) that ( ) ( )Vw Vw3 2ε < ε  
because X2 < X3 (recall that Π2 > 0 when ω  = 0). This proves that w2 < w3. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Consider again the linear product demand P = m–nX. Then the relevant elasticities are given 
by (A.5)–(A.11). 
 
Proof of part (i)  
Because the first order conditions are equal in Cases 1 and 5, w1 = w5. If the profit–constraint 
is not binding in Case 2 (Π2 > 0), the wage elasticities in Cases 1, 2 and 5 is independent of 
the value of ω . Thus, the result from part (i) Proposition 3 carries over. Notice, however, that 
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Π2 > 0 only if α < 1 when ω  > 0. Thus, w2 is strictly lower than w1 = w5. If the profit–
constraint is binding in Case 2 (Π2 = 0), utilizing (A.5) and (A.6) gives that w2 < w1 if  
( )
( ) ( )21 21 2 2 2 2
m 2nXm 4nX m 2nX
m 2nX m nX m nX m nX X
−− − αω< +− − − − −ω .              (A.16)
Compared to (A.12), there is a new term on the right hand side of the inequality. Clearly, if 
X2 = 2X1, the condition is fulfilled with strict inequality in contrast to the situation when ω  = 
0. Thus, w2 < w1 if 2 1X 2X≤ , which always holds even when the profit–constraint is not 
binding as proved above. This proves that w2 < w1 = w5. 
 
If Π2 = 0, the outcomes in Cases 2–4 are equally determined by the profit–constraint, and thus 
w2 = w3 = w4. Notice that this implies that w3 (= w4) < w1 when Π2 = 0. Fixed costs increases 
( )Nw 3ε , which may make w3 < w1 even though α > 0.5. Thus, when ω  is so high that Π2 = 0 
in Case 2, ( )Nw 3ε  has increased so much that the wage is always lower in Case 3 than in 
Case 1. 
 
If Π2 > 0, two opposite effects may make Nwε  smaller or larger in Case 3 than in Case 2. 
First, N2 < N3, giving the result in part (i) Proposition 3 (the κ’s labour demand effect). 
Second, ( )Nw 3ε  is increasing in the fixed cost ω  (the fixed costs’ labour demand effect). For 
a small ω , the former effect dominates, making w2 < w3. For a large ω , N3 will be small and 
close to N2. Thus, the former effect is minor while the latter effect is large. Thus, there exists 
a critical level of ω , say cω , for which w2 < w3 = w4 if cω< ω and w3 = w4 < w2 if cω > ω .  
 
Proof of part (ii) 
From (A.7) and (A.11), it follows that ( ) ( )Vw Vw5 1ε < ε  because ω  are not included in 
( )Vw 5ε . Since (εNw)1 = (εNw)5, this proves that w1 < w5. From (A.8) and (A.11), it is clear that 
( ) ( )Vw Vw5 2ε < ε , independent of the size of Π2. Since ( ) ( )Nw Nw5 2ε ≤ ε , this proves that 
w2 < w5. Comparing Cases 3 and 4, it follows from (A.9) and (A.10) that ( ) ( )Vw Vw4 3ε < ε . 
Since (εNw)3 = (εNw)4, this proves that w3 < w4. 
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Comparing Cases 1 and 2, two opposite effects may make Vwε  smallest or largest in Case 2. 
First, without fixed costs, ( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε < ε  (the κ’s employer objective effect). Second, fixed  
costs have a larger effect on ( )Vw 1ε  than on ( )Vw 2ε  (the fixed costs’ employer objective 
effect). When Π2 > 0, ( ) ( )Vw Vw1 2ε < ε  if 
1 2
1
1 2 2 12
m 2nX m nX1 1
m nX X m nX X
   − ω − ω− ≤ −   − −   
                (A.17) 
Since X1 < X2, the value of the parenthesis on the left hand side of the inequality is greater 
than the value of the parenthesis on the right hand side. Thus, X2 ≤ 2X1 is not a sufficient 
condition for (A.17) to hold, and, generally, it is ambiguous whether the wage is lowest in 
Case 1 or 2. 
 
If Π2 > 0, the sign of the wage differential between Cases 2 and 3 is ambiguous by part (i) of 
the proposition. If Π2 = 0, the outcome in the two cases will be equal if the wage is equal. 
Because (εNw)2 = (εNw)3, it follows that, w2 < w3 if ( ) ( )Vw Vw3 2ε < ε  for X2 = X3. Comparing 
(A.8) and (A.9), it is clear that this is fulfilled. This proves that w2 < w3 if Π2 = 0. 
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Table 1: Wage elasticities 
 εNw εVw 
Case 1 
(Profit maximization) ( )1 N 1
1
1κακ + ε −
 ( )
1 1
1
1 w N1 1
ω
ακ
ακ + −  
Case 2 
(Welfare maximization) ( )
2 22 w N
1
1 J 1ωακ + −  
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2
2
2
2 2 2 2
w N
CS
CS
w N w N
1 J 1 J J
1 J J 1 1 1 J
+ω
ω
α − κ − +
α − + κ + − − − α  
Case 3 
(Output maximization) ( )
3 33 w N
1
1 1ωακ + −  ( )
3 33 w N
1 1ω
α
ακ + −  
Case 4 
(Revenue maximization) ( )
4 44 w N
1
1 1ωακ + −
 ( )
4 4
4
4 w N1 1
ω
ακ
ακ + −  
Case 5 
(Management maximization) ( )5 N 5
1
1κακ + ε −
 5
5 1
ακ
ακ −  
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Table 2. Simulated outcomes, inverse demand is P = bX-ψ 
Example 1 2 3 4  5 
Parameter 
values 
0ω =  
γ = 0 
κ = 0.5 
b = 20 
0ω =  
γ = 2 
κ = 0.5 
b = 20 
5ω =  
γ = 0 
κ = 0.5 
b = 20 
5ω =  
γ = 2 
κ = 0.5 
b = 20 
 5ω =  
γ = 2 
κ = 0.8 
b = 5.3a 
Dependent variable w N w N w N w N  w N 
Case 1  
(Profit maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
6.9 
 
1.50 
 
16.3 
 
2.50 
 
6.9 
 
1.45 
 
17.2 
  
1.14 
 
29.8 
Case 2 
(Welfare maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
22.1 
 
1.50 
 
51.7 
 
2.50 
 
22.1 
 
1.49 
 
52.5 
  
1.17 
 
52.2 
Case 3 
(Output maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
32.0 
 
1.30 
 
95.2 
 
2.34 
 
32.0 
 
1.29 
 
90.0 
  
1.14 
 
90.0 
Case 4 
(Revenue maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
32.0 
 
1.50 
 
75.0 
 
2.34 
 
32.0 
 
1.48 
 
71.3 
  
1.17 
 
84.7 
Case 5 
(Management maximization) 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
2.50 
 
6.9 
 
1.50 
 
16.3 
  
1.19 
 
26.8 
Parameter values are a = w = 1 and α = 0.8. The values of b, ω , γ and κ = 1–ψ are given in the second row of 
the table. 
a In Example 5, the value of b chosen such that the employment in Case 3 is equal in Examples 4 and 5. 
 25
Table 3. Simulated outcome, inverse demand is P = m–nX 
Example 1 2 3 4  5 
Parameter 
values 
0ω =  
γ = 0 
m = 7.50a 
n = 0.1563a 
0ω =  
γ = 2 
m = 7.50 
n = 0.1563 
5ω =  
γ = 0 
m = 7.50 
n = 0.1563 
5ω =  
γ = 2 
m = 7.50 
n = 0.1563 
 5ω =  
γ = 2 
m = 5.00b 
b = 0.0775b 
Dependent variable w N w N w N w N  w N 
Case 1 
(Profit maximization) 
 
2.42 
 
13.1 
 
1.50 
 
24.0 
 
2.42 
 
13.1 
 
1.45 
 
24.7 
  
1.24 
 
25.1 
Case 2 
(Welfare maximization) 
 
2.17 
 
27.8 
 
1.41 
 
51.0 
 
2.17 
 
27.8 
 
1.39 
 
51.9 
  
1.21 
 
47.9 
Case 3 
(Output maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
32.0 
 
1.66 
 
54.3 
 
2.34 
 
32.0 
 
1.61 
 
52.7 
  
1.33 
 
52.7 
Case 4 
(Revenue maximization) 
 
2.50 
 
32.0 
 
2.08 
 
41.9 
 
2.34 
 
32.0 
 
1.98 
 
41.4 
  
1.45 
 
45.7 
Case 5 
(Management maximization) 
 
2.42 
 
13.1 
 
1.50 
 
24.0 
 
2.42 
 
13.1 
 
1.50 
 
24.0 
  
1.29 
 
23.9 
Parameter values are a = w = 1 and α = 0.8. The values of m, n, ω  and γ are given in the second row of the 
table. 
a The value of m and n is chosen such that κ and N are equal in the present and previous (Table 2) simulations 
for Case 3 in Example 1. 
b In example 5, κ is increased by reducing n. The value of m is chosen such that the employment in Case 3 is 
equal in Examples 4 and 5. 
Table 4. The effects on the relative wage between profit maximization (Case 1) and the other 
cases 
 Case 2, Π2 > 0 
(Welfare 
maximization)
Case 2, Π2 = 0 
(Welfare 
maximization)
Case 3 
(Output 
maximization)
Case 4 
(Revenue 
maximization) 
Case 5  
(Management 
maximization) 
The non–monetary 
objective effect 
None None Positive None None 
The fixed costs’ labour 
demand effect 
None Positive Positive Positive None 
The fixed costs’ employer 
objective effect 
Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
The κ’s labour demand  
effect 
Positive Positive Negative  
if α > 0.5 
Negative  
if α > 0.5 
None 
The κ’s employer  
objective effect 
Positive Positive Negative Negative None 
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Figure 1: Outcome and employer type 
 
